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A Question of Endings
Lawrence Kimmel
Prefatory Remark
What is the nature and meaning of death?
As a
philosophical question, the answer is surely, as it is for every
such question: “It depends.” On the context of the asker,
among other things: social, cultural, historical,
existential…whether young or old, whether under duress or
at leisure, whether in harms way or secure, whether in pain
or depression or in the bloom of health. We are inclined to
think of death, abstractly as well as referentially, as an event,
something that happens, or as a state, something that has
happened. So inclined we expect an objective response to a
neutral question: one lives for a given length of time and
then one dies. But there is a depth to the question of death
that invites coherent resolution rather than abstract
conjecture; its source is the passion of imagination rather
than a measure of reason. Our most intimate concern and
what makes the question both acute and deep is the
awareness of the inevitability of our own death. It is only
here that imagination fully engages the frustrating mystery
and resistant logic of absolute limits. Whether the personal
question of identity and destiny is foremost on an agenda of
inquiry into the nature and meaning of death, it is the
background of every inquiry: We would know the complete
sense of our lives which includes our death. In knowing that
we are going to die, it is an insistent and further need of our
nature to know what it is to die. Death is the final paradox
on the far reaches of self knowledge. This is the setting of
our question, the force of our desire to know. The problem
of course is that death is nothing, or rather, a something that
cannot be known, nor can we desist from pursuing the
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question. If philosophy begins in wonder, wonder comes up
against the limits of its possibility in death.
I
“What kind of world is this anyway? Why not
make fewer barnacle larvae and give them a
decent chance?...the sea is a cup of death and the
land is a stained altar stone…If an aphid lays a
million eggs, several might survive…It’s a
wretched system.” --Annie Dillard
Is it a wretched system? Is life a bad deal given the cost?
It is, of course, the only deal so the question is moot. That
doesn’t still the impulse to complain, however, or in our best
days under the apple bough, to sing in our chains like the
sea. A parallel to Dillard’s grievance is found in John
Barth’s familiar modern myth “Night Sea Journey” in which
creatures thrashing through the night sea speculate about
their situation, their maker, their destiny, and their journey
swimming toward some rumored distant shore. Millions die
in the process, yet they keep on thrashing, occasionally
crying out ‘Love!’, ‘Love!’, until the narrator at last alone,
sole survivor of all who began is drawn into a rushing final
surge to the shore, toward Her in whom some mindless
destiny is to be fulfilled. But with his last breath he
pronounces his blasphemous desire and hope that all who
come after will find the grace of denial of this heritage, and
so be spared the meaningless, mindless repetition that claims
such carnage. The key to the mythic parable, if one is
needed, is realizing that the narrator is a spermatozoon, the
vital element of continuance in a drama that echoes Dillard’s
conclusion: it’s a wretched system.
Barth’s message concerning oppressive cycles of suffering
is an echo of the philosophical pessimism of Schopenhauer
who’s recommended denial of the will is an acknowledged
poor second alternative given in the counsel of Silenus:
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‘Better not to have been born at all!’ Compared with the
anguish of being alive the stillness and oblivion of death
seems a consummation devoutly to be wished. While
Schopenhauer finds the system no less wretched than
Dillard, Nietzsche’s rejection of the pessimism of his teacher
offers a more positive view of the matter: while
acknowledging that Nature is extravagant in its waste, he
celebrates the glory and abundant fecundity of life.
Familiar expressions in both Hebraic and
Greek scriptures record the cycles of human life
from a god’s eye view:
As for man, his days are as grass. As a flower of
the field, so he flourishes. For the wind passes
over it, and it is gone, and the place thereof shall
know it no more.
(Old Testament, Psalm 103)
As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men.
The wind scatters the leaves to the ground: the
vigorous forest puts forth others, and they grow
in the spring season. Soon one generation of men
comes and another ceases.
(Iliad, Book VI)
Whether lament, anger, or exultation, whether recorded in
naturalistic or poetic terms, the human response to this
dissolute cycle of life and death in which animals feed on
animals, brothers murder brothers, and all living things are
consumed in death, has found expression from the earliest
literature in which rage and sorrow speak to the cost of life
in death, and particularly of the consciousness of death in
life. The very horror of the spectacle that Dillard depicts
along with the inevitable sentence foreseen by everyman is a
common occasion for the pretence that it is not there.
Literature on the other hand, as exemplified by Dillard’
remark, has made a tradition of assembling reminders that it
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is there, seeking to discover especially in the sacrificial lives
of men and dying gods, not a justification of the system, but
some semblance of meaning in our subjection to it.
‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth… formed
man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath
of life…’ The codicil however, is ‘…dust thou art and unto
dust return.’ So goes the story in a few short chapters of
Genesis: beginning and end, non-being-to-non-being, earthto-earth. So told, the life of man is but a dust that stirs, and
settles. But what interests us most in this telling is what
happens east of Eden among the residuals of creation
suffering the ensuing curse of death. In violating the
conditions of Eden Man gains knowledge of good and evil in
innocence overcome, but at what terrible price? In the
moment of negotiation with the serpent everything is
changed: the wages of existence are now suffering and death.
Once this story is told, the simple passage of being into nonbeing becomes intolerable. For better or worse, the narrative
is no longer God’s but Man’s. God’s occasional voice
eventually becomes silent, and there remains only the sound
of creatures bound to the seasons of the earth. The problem
of Adam in Eden that spawns the temporality of the earthborn frames the consciousness of human existence. The
ensuing riddle of death is without final resolution, or perhaps
death is the final resolution—not an answer, simply an end to
the question. Part of the point of the story of Eden is that
Man chose death (albeit in the promise of the knowledge of
good and evil). The literature of human culture has in a
sense been a troubled discernment of just what it is that was
chosen.
The question of death pervades the arts; and its most
powerful expressions leave the question open. Typical of the
Vanitas tradition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries by
painters like Felicien Rops, Max Klinger and Paul Cesar
Helleu is a picture of a beautiful woman in a ball gown at a
vanity table before a mirror. Our first impression is to be
drawn into the beauty of the woman, but a second perception
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shifts to a larger gestalt of the whole painting—a boney skull
of death. A rabbit/duck shift in perspective, only here the
elision in perception is beauty/death. This graphic paradox
of death in life allows us to make inferences about beauty
and brevity, construct interpretations about vanity and time,
but there is no answer, really—only the question of death
remains in the silence of the frame. There is fullness to the
silence of death yoked with beauty—a visual analogue to the
poet’s lament that…after many a summer/ dies the swan.
Death, wherever, however, and whenever it occurs is the
boundary of consciousness and life, and in the ordinary
discourse of life we are at a loss about the meaning of such
absolute limits. On further reflection and for the individual
concerned, the limit of consciousness is only a question
mark. I am the whole of my existence, but most of all I am
this particular, acute consciousness independent of whatever
descriptions or prescriptions befall the accoutrements of my
body. Beyond this there is nothing—or rather, it is a nothing
consciousness cannot assimilate.
Consciousness, common to every human life, nonetheless
has stages. Eden is the world of childhood, a time of forever
in which nobody dies. East of Arcadia however, is the
fateful world of choice caught in the grip of the paradox of
life in death/ death in life that has been the passion of
creative imagination in world literature. If love is the primal
energy of literature, death is the crucible in which it is
formed—the ground, limit, and full stop of inquiries into the
meaning of life. In the metabolism of nature we can trace
the life energy of leaves back to the branches, through the
trunk to the roots and to the earth, which itself is the fecund
remains of leaf, branch, trunk and root that sustain the cycle
of life from death, earth to earth. The woods decay and
weep their burden to the earth, and the earth yields new life.
We can track the mystery of this cycle, but the hiatus of
consciousness remains a mystery unto itself.
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II
Wisdom yields perhaps only the words and worlds of old
men, in which no child believes, just as the child has hopes
and fears the old can no longer remember. It is well to
remind ourselves that as there are stages in the perception in
life, so too are there stages in the perception of death. Youth
is endowed with an aggressive energy in which passion
engages competition and is fulfilled in production and
possession. The fires are banked in the aged, who more
passively accept and appreciate the passing occurrences of
life. If death means nothing to the child, it means only risk
for the young. Living with death is a gradual learning of age
that brings refinement of perception as diminished
compensation for loss. This is to say that there are different
ways of dying as well as living and different perspectives on
both relative to stages in life and positions in culture. The
modern European dies no more than lives in the way of his
ancestors. There may be an interest in an analysis of
historical differences along with differences among living
cultures, but here the point is only to mark the fact that it is
so.
Fictive literature which celebrates differences also seeks to
discern in each concrete instance of difference an intuition of
universal meaning, under the presumption that whatever lies
beyond the bourn from which no traveler returns, we are all
joined as fellow travelers. ‘Never send to know for whom
the bell tolls…’ is a poetic conceit within a particular culture,
but a sound can be found in every culture to announce the
meaning of this measured inevitability. Consciousness is the
sustaining current of human existence, but however we
choose to live or die we are creatures caught in the web of
time, and we know it in our most intimate and alone
moments.
There is a story, possibly apocryphal, of a last conversation
between Alice B. Toklas and Gertrude Stein as her life
6

companion was lying in bed dying of stomach cancer.
Gertrude asked quietly “Alice…Alice…what is the answer?”
Her friend replied. “I don’t know, Gertrude.” Later,
Gertrude spoke again, more faintly: “Alice…what is the
question?” Stein, philosophical to the end was also plain to a
fault, and there is no reason to think this was not a genuine
question— a question she puts to herself: it is a question that
is an answer which remains a question. Inquiring into the
question of death, we need less an answer—or what is surely
the case, many answers—than a deep and sustained
reflection on the question. But what is the question? What
are we asking, to whom, and why? Judging from the
diversity of the literature on death, there is no general answer
and perhaps no single question in the asking. The rule in
philosophy that one should never attempt to answer a
question until she fully understands the question applies
here.
There is a line from scripture in the liturgical music of the
Mass: “Be not afraid…for I am with you always…” It is a
line that may or may not carry the weight of promise and
reassurance for anyone hearing it. Some in the congregation
will hear the words as syllables sung to a familiar tune, but
there will be someone at Mass for whom these words will be
personal, intense, and utterly necessary. We are each at
different places in our lives and worlds, and not everything
makes sense or is meaningful independently, and just so.
The same is surely true about any script, any question, any
answer, including and perhaps especially the question of
death. Death is not a question, or not in question for a child,
and though it may become a pressing question for those in
harms way or the very old, it may or may not be framed in
pain, sorrow or terror. If there exists no neutral context in
which to put this question, what philosophical inquiry is
possible? In an earlier essay in volume one of this series I
analyzed the idea that death is nothing, in the sense that it is
not a possible experience in one’s life. People die, of course,
and death is a meaningful word, but to understand the
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limiting concept requires a comprehensive view of the many
disciplines and discourses which surround it, and in its
various contexts of use. What is death? Is there one
question here or a thousand? And, in philosophical terms, to
whom but ourselves do we put the question? And in which
case, what is it we don’t know in our asking? The most
general and pointed response seems to be that my ultimate
concern is not with your death, or anyone’s death, but my
own: this is the question the meaning of which I want to
understand.
A philosophical investigation of the question begins by
allowing the question to take hold of imagination. So
understood the question of death—my death—is such that
theoretical investigation is irrelevant, and if speculation is
idle, how do we proceed? Wittgenstein recommends as a
test and corrective to vacuous philosophical questions that
we first ask ourselves: Why am I asking the question? What
don’t I know? What do I want? If the question is genuine,
then what is it that I am fearful or hopeful about that this
question may bring to the surface? Such are the issues,
confronting us, I think. Perhaps the question of death can
only be personal, and it will be personal in different ways for
the same person in different circumstances, and at different
stages of her life. It may be useful at this juncture to point
out that the appeal and force of fictive literature is to find in
such personal moments and concrete circumstances,
intuitions that will resonate with emotional and spiritual
needs and perceptions that transcend their individual
expression. If this is so, it is appropriate for our purposes to
draw on the non-theoretical, non-explanatory discourse that
has addressed itself to the issue of death from the beginnings
of human thought.
The approach of literature to such
questions comes in the form of an invitation to share in the
experience of the writer. Like the question of faith, a
response to the intimacy of death is more like bearing
witness to feelings and shared perspective than that of
discovering or reporting some independent truth. The
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understanding we want requires the engagement, then, of
creative imagination.
Thought, in the absence of
imagination is abstraction; imagination is experiential. If
death as the limiting frame of consciousness is not a possible
experience, our only resource of understanding is
imagination, which again confirms the domain of
philosophical inquiry. But, still, if there is no possible
experience, what is it I am then to imagine? I can imagine
being a bug, a rock, a plant, an angel—indeed familiar
characters in literature—but in every case to so imagine is to
attribute consciousness to the thing I become: consciousness
is a necessary condition of intelligibility in such imaginative
metamorphosis. Each of these is an experiential possibility
through imagination, so exists as possibility in a way which
imagining my death does not.
III
Confronting one’s own death in imagination is a signature
issue in existential literature, expressed as a confrontation
with nothingness. Sartre’s philosophical analysis of this
confrontation may seem contrived, but contextual
descriptions in his fiction are remarkable in their intuitional
disclosures. The arts in general may present our best
opportunity to inquire into the question of death in the full
openness of imagination. In the philosophical novel—
Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, Proust—the nature of death often
becomes transparent within the complex personal
relationships among characters over the space of the novel.
Poetry strives for a greater intimacy of expression in framing
a concrete image, metaphor, or analogy—following an
intuition of the sort, for example, that in the nothingness of
death, the mind seems drawn into the density and darkness of
what is observed in space as a Black Hole. In its death
throes, a star it implodes upon itself to become a darkness so
dense that it absorbs all passing light, and from which no
light escapes. The blackness is not empty but fully imploded
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space, a complete condensation of light, hence the paradox:
the color of light is black On analogy with death, there can
be no experience of this, no inside looking out, it is an
enigma: whatever we learn of it is by analogy, inference,
indirection, and the expressions of metaphor. The
imaginative experience of death, on this analogy, is being
drawn into the density of such darkness, a conception of
consciousness imploding on itself. My example is a pale
analytic of the dramatic force of poetic discourse, obviously,
but perhaps the point will be clear anyhow.
It is the special province of the poetic imagination to
capture the acute intimacy of death in such condensed form.
The philosophical difficulty consists in the extremity of the
margins of experience—a problem of sense: it is less the
strangeness of the unknown than the inaccessibility of the
unknowable. As death is an impossible experience, what is
the imagination to lock onto, in trading off knowledge for
understanding? There are apparently no limits to the creative
impulse of the arts, with the understanding that the resulting
expressions at best yield sense, not truth—or if truth, then it
is a truth of the heart immune from verification. An
alternative within literature to the condensed crystallization
of emotion in poetic metaphor is found, for example, in
Tolstoy’s Ivan Illich, which investigates the emotional
response of an individual to the awareness of impending
death, describing anxiety, denial, regret, anger, fear,
humiliation…and final acceptance. This is a painful and
moving portrait of an individual life approaching its end, an
examination of the life-consciousness of an individual person
as he resists the gradual realization that he is dying.
In either case, in life and in literature, the problem of
imagination concerning death itself, the inner sense of the
reality of it, remains. I can imagine dying, the process, but it
is another kind of logic required to imagine being dead. It is
clearly possible to imagine my family, my colleagues and
friends, the university, etc. going on (as it will) without me.
But imagining this with the emotional import of experience,
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entails that I become a spectator. The content of this image
is held in my continued perception of things. I can imagine
being killed, but again consciousness continues even as my
body is broken to pieces amid the disintegrating wreckage of
the airplane.
There are two related ideas that we are contending with:
death as end—of life, of consciousness; and death as a
limit—of understanding, of consciousness
In the First Critique, Kant argues or rather simply
acknowledges that at a certain point reason comes up against
its own limits.
In discussing the antinomies, and later
distinguishing the phenomenal and nouminal, Kant outlines
the incorrigible and absolute limits of the understanding. For
example on the question of the beginning of existence—the
juncture of nothing/ then something—we are inclined several
contradictory ways—that something must have existed
always, as against the impossibility of a beginning ex nihilo;
but then we are left with the idea of infinite time—indeed
that a infinite period of time has already elapsed. We are
impelled to make claims that cannot be established,
confronted by equally plausible and contradictory claims that
are equally indeterminate, yet there must be an answer. It is
natural and compelling for human beings to want a rational
picture of the world and of human existence that is
understandable. But it is also clear that knowledge cannot
satisfy that need. Kant waxes uncharacteristically eloquent
and resorts to metaphor in this section of the First Critique,
in which he pictures sensibility as an island surrounded by
the raging seas of unintelligibility, filled only with illusions
of a distant shore.
Kant’s conclusion and counsel is that we simply abandon
the attempt to see the universe as a whole, sub specie
aeternitatis. The absolute limits of reason with respect to the
existence of the universe in time and space, are analogous, of
course to the absolute limits of consciousness, with respect
to individual in life and death. As death is a limit to life and
experience, it is also a limit to understanding. I cannot
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comprehend my existence from outside my existence, so
imagination must find other resources for understanding
these limits. Kierkegaard gives an existential twist to the
same point, speaking of the absurdity of the mind trying to
think what cannot be thought. He has in mind not only the
transcendental conceits of Hegel, but of the ordinary human
being confronting her own existence, aspiring to know what
is not within the domain of knowledge. Kierkegaard’s
philosophical argument cites the additional modality and
movement of faith which opens the possibility not for
rational understanding, but for existential resolution. The
force of this suggestion is the idea that the question of death
is an appeal not to thought and reason, but to imagination
and passion, and can be answered only in the paradox life.
Pascal has a similar view in his insistence that the heart has
reasons which reason does not know. Such resolution is
committed to the idea that existence is more fundamental
than knowledge and that the total human consciousness is
not comprehended in reason, but finds extension in
imagination.
IV
But what does it mean to say that the answer to the
question of death as an absolute limit cannot be answered in
thought, only in the living experience of imagination? It
seems we once again come full circle to where we began,
with a question within a question. And having made this
circle, what more do we understand about our own death? It
is hardly enlightening to say we can only live in the
imaginative experience our own death. Even that is a
confusing way to put it. At most it returns us once again to
the surrogate domain of fictive literature which makes
experience of other lives possible within creative
imagination, and provides the resource of metaphor to bridge
if not transcend the antinomies of reason.
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Heidegger’s concept of human being as being unto death,
requires—in order to become fully alive—that the individual
cease the pretence of anonymity with respect to death. To
acknowledge that “one dies”, is for Heidegger a way of
putting oneself and others at ease about death. He cites
Tolstoi’s account in Ivan Ilyich as exemplary of the idea that
it is only in confronting the reality of one’s own death that
one becomes fully alive, authentically human. Heidegger
insists that anxiety is a necessary mode of realization that
discovers the meaning of life in the concrete particularity and
consciousness of one’s own death. However, it is not clear
that crisis is a requisite condition of realization either of
one’s own death, or of authentic existence. If Plato’s
account is to be believed, the death of Socrates shows no
anxiety in confronting death; his calm demeanor is possibly
explained as philosophically distanced, but the particularity
of the circumstances attests to genuine courage and argues
against the anonymity of death.
Sartre, opposing Heidegger’s idea of being unto death, and
so the notion that it is death that gives meaning to life, insists
rather that death is that which on principle removes all
meaning from life. Sartre is struck instead by the
determinations of chance at the heart of every project, and
the heart of chance is the variable if inevitable fact that death
may at any point reduce human potential and possibility to
absurdity. At still another positive extreme, Holderlin, in his
poem To the Fates, provides a poetic affirmation that
requires neither definitive knowledge or supplemental
assurance, such that a single summer that ripens into a single
autumn in the accomplishment of the hearts project is
enough to welcome the stillness of the shadow world: having
once lived like the gods in the fullness of life’s power,
nothing more is needed. In this case, death is welcomed
soberly, not from pain, not in anxiety, not with resentment,
or in the expectation of any promise of transcendence, but in
simple gratitude for the fullness of life.
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Images and metaphors of death in literature are of course
drawn from life however we may try to extend them beyond
that source. In addition to the variability of individual and
cultural values that make death a litany of differences, it
should also be noted that the modern temper is constituted in
a radically secular age that lacks anything resembling
genuine conviction in immortality. However many among
us may be given to a rhetoric and profession of hope in
eternity, the operational values that serve as the currency of
culture attest to the fact that death is a wall not a window to
eternity. No longer conceiving of life against a background
of eternity, time becomes foreshortened in death, and the
density of individuated experiences become proxy for an
extenuation of life. As death is not a passing through time
into eternity, it becomes, in the temper of the age, a truncated
occasion for sensuous moments that sustain immediacy.
Images of death in the visual arts have remained variable in
symbolic depiction, both allegorical and realistic—the
hooded figure with scythe, sand sifting through the hour
glass, the carnage of war, the putrefied corpse. The world of
art is graced with exemption from argument or explanation
and free from the expectation of closure. In the power of its
expression death remains an open and elemental question
within the mystery of creation.
As a child during the great world war my first recollection
of death was abstract and distant. Later, engaged as a
participant in another war, death became commonplace and
immediate. Much later, disengaged as a reluctant witness to
nightly television coverage of yet another war, I learned yet
another aspect of death. . Death at a remove in war,
however real, remains an abstract thing. Even as a child
listening to the hushed voices of the women as they gathered
around the radio at night to hear news of the war, I sensed
but not did not understand the fear of death that held them in
bondage. Many years later, asking my young children to
leave the room as the television gloried in the continuing
trauma of body-counts in a despised war; the numbers alone
14

muted the visceral reality of death. In war itself, killing
fields scatter carnage in a routine that deadens the heart and
numbs the brain to the reality of death. At 70 years of age,
after suffering a heart attack, two spinal surgeries, open-heart
surgery and the loss of many close friends and family, it is
not difficult to remember the many different and shifting
perspectives of death that have been part of my own journey
in life. We learn of death in a thousand different ways as we
walk through the valley of shadows; it is never the same.
If a child is lucky, her first intimate sense of the reality of
death for may come from the loss of a pet. My first born was
5 years old when he first encountered death. We had two
alligators adopted from his Montessori pre-school when the
teacher that owned them moved away. The Caymans were
named Joe and Sally. We had them for almost a year when
one morning I heard Bret cry out, and I went to find him
staring in anguish into the tank where Sally was floating
belly up. As a single parent with two small children, whom I
had to get to day-care and pre-school before I went to meet
my first class of the day, I said that we must take Sally out of
the tank, and bury her in the back yard by the fence. I
wrapped Sally in a cloth, got a shovel and went with two
boys ages 5 and 3 out to the back of our property to bury
Sally. The three year old said that Sally would not like the
dirt, that she couldn’t breathe, and we should get a box for
her. The 5 year old was still in tears, grieving. I felt the
need to come up with some explanation for all this.
Unfortunately I decided on the abstract account, that nothing
in the universe is ever destroyed, only transference of matter
and energy. Sally, in the earth would become the life energy
to sustain other life. It seemed like a good story and we all
went on to our day. More than a year later, I was awakened
in the night by the crying of one of the children. I went into
their bedroom and found Bret waking from a nightmare. I
asked what was wrong, and in the grip of a painful anxiety
he replied “I don’t want to die”. I explained that I, his father
would live for many, many years, and then eventually I
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would die, and then he would live on for many, many years,
so he had nothing to worry about right now. That, again,
seemed, albeit from a not very intelligent adult perspective,
reasonable reassurance. I asked, “Now, what is it you are
really afraid of?” and he said, in tearful misery: “I don’t want
to become a Banana plant.” It took a moment to remember
that the place we had buried Sally almost two years before
was beneath some banana trees. In retrospect, I should
probably have told him that Sally had died and had gone to
live with Jesus in heaven.
The point of this story is about telling stories, and perhaps
acknowledging differences in perception, including the limits
of a child at a concrete operational stage of development.
But the larger point is there is always and only a story to be
told and it is a critical question to ask who will be able to
understand a particular telling. It is hard to imagine a master
narrative that that will clarify, much less answer the question
of death for everyone.
Recall that Aristotle accounts for life in terms of the form
of the soul: the living plant has a nutritive soul, the animal an
animate soul, the human being a rational soul. When we
remark that only human being die, we mean, of course, that
we are the creatures who know we are going to die, it
pervades our living.
Death comes not only to the
Archbishop but to the humble peasant. Animals also are
killed and die out, their life forms disintegrating into the
aether. What stories of death comprehend the whole of
life—of plants, of animals, of mountains, no less than of
Man? This question brings us full circle and back through
Dillard to the point of the terrible intimacy of our bargain
with life—in the realization that the end of every story is the
uncertain truth that death holds dominion. The story of your
own life, the life you are living—that within which you are a
character just as you are the narrator that sustains the world
of that character—comes to an end and trails off. As I am
my world and my life the world of my consciousness, there
is a critical sense in which the world ends in my dying.
16

In our allotment of time, and within the literature and
litanies of death, we search for expressions of this final and
mysterious intimacy in which we are all brought together,
but
Voices only falter in failing light,
Drawn into tides and winds of night,
Bleed into resounding grave
Where mind and calling meet
In the bleak morning gray.
In death, there are no final answers only continuing
questions, no theories that yield truth, only stories that search
out sense, only the grace of creative imagination that sustains
the meaning of our lives within death’s limit. And that, as
Joyce reminds us, is the he and the she of it.
Lawrence Kimmel
Trinity University
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